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The phenomenon of 
irregular migration
In the mid 2000s, Senegalese nationals accounted 
for the largest proportion of irregular migrants 
intercepted in the Mediterranean. These irregular 
boat migrants, who risked their lives to reach 
Europe, were described as young single men 
between 20 and 29 years of age belonging to the 
Mouride brotherhood (a branch of Islam originating 
in the Senegalese city of Touba) and the Wolof ethnic 
group. In the decade between those studies and 
this research, there has been a diversification both 
of routes and of the ethnicities of people migrating 
from Senegal, in response to the changing policy 
context and the emergence of a more established 
migration industry. Accounts show that overland 
journeys via Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and onwards 
to Morocco or Libya are just as important as the sea 
route via Mauritania towards Spain, if not more so. 
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Key lessons
• The criminalisation of migrant smuggling has not succeeded in eliminating the practice.
• Risk-awareness campaigns do not deter irregular migrants as there are complex socio-
cultural reasons for migrating.
• Efforts need to be made to open up more channels for legal migration and labour circulation.
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A marabout from a village in the Kolda region 
holding a rosary. The telephone connects him 
with migrants or their families. Next to it is 
a book and against the wall a tablet called a 
‘Halwaa’, on which are written holy verses.
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A high-risk decision
As routes and migrant profiles have diversified, so 
have the infrastructures of migration mediation. 
This research provides an up-to-date account of 
the structure and functioning of the Senegalese 
migration industry: the functions of actors at 
different levels and in different spaces, the social 
relations between them and the transactions 
they carry out, whether and how they relate to 
each other and what the implications are for 
migrant welfare. The research was conducted 
by the University of Assane Seck in Ziguinchor 
in collaboration with the University of Sussex, in 
the Casamance area of Senegal. Casamance is an 
important point of origin for migrants travelling 
towards Libya and also a transit point for migrants 
from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Conakry 
and The Gambia.
The last decade also saw the intensification of 
border controls through sea patrols as well as 
measures such as the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime’s Regional Strategy to Combat 
Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of 
Migrants in West and Central Africa (2015–20). 
However, the investment and effort that have gone 
into in these control measures have not resulted in 
a concomitant drop in irregular migration, as the 
migration industry has adapted to new controls, and 
‘victims of trafficking’ are notoriously difficult to 
identify on the ground. Another aim of the research 
was therefore to show how irregular migration 
is organised against this backdrop of tightening 
controls on migration to Europe. 
The research was conducted in four regions: 
Kolda region (Medina Yoro Foulla, Vélingara and 
Kolda departments), Sédhiou region (Goudomp 
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Figure 1 Route used by migrants travelling from Senegal to the Libyan Coast
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department and Tanaf locality), Ziguinchor region 
(Oussouye department, Elinkine locality) and 
Tambacounda region (Tambacounda city). Although 
not part of Casamance, the latter was included 
because many brokers are located there. Interviews 
were conducted with aspiring migrants (18), 
returned and deported migrants (26), the families 
of migrants (12), six smugglers and four civil society 
organisations. All the interviewees were male. 
Although the plan was to interview equal numbers 
of men and women, the research team did not 
succeed in speaking to any female migrants, and all 
the male interviewees denied the existence of any 
female migrants at all. The independent migration 
of women to foreign countries is stigmatised in 
Kolda because of the belief that they must sell sex 
in order to survive. These stereotypes about female 
migration were reinforced by radio broadcasts 
about the vulnerability of women to being trafficked 
for sex. Interviews with smugglers do indicate 
that women may use sex transactionally to obtain 
protection for a safe passage; however these 
activities are not necessarily forced. 
The interviews at the point of origin show that the 
decision to migrate was taken in spite of the high 
risks, as migration was seen as the only way out 
of a life with no future. It was regarded as key to 
realising dreams and visions of a more prosperous 
future. This is wrapped up with masculinities and 
the desire to be a good family provider and/or 
son but migration is also seen as an escape from 
dishonourable ways of making a living locally. As 
one father said, he would prefer his son to migrate 
rather than sell timber illegally and bring shame 
upon himself and the family: 
Either he migrated or he would have got into 
complicated situations like for example selling 
[wood] and trafficking between Senegal and 
Gambia. Imagine the shame I would have 
felt towards my relatives if he had fallen into 
delinquency. He had to go. 
The structure of the 
migration industry
The migration industry in Kolda is characterised by 
a plurality of actors who work either together or 
independently and who may have fluid roles depending 
on the need of the moment and their capacity to find 
innovative solutions to a particular problem. Thus, 
understanding how they come together in assemblages 
of functioning is probably more helpful than viewing 
them as separate and discretely identifiable entities 
with clear-cut hierarchies. Profit-making and altruistic 
motives may overlap, but we classify actors as altruistic 
or transactional depending on their predominant 
motivation. Altruistic migration actors are found at the 
place of origin and include returnees, deportees, friends 
and family members, who offer advice on where to cross 
the border, which modes of transport to use, how to 
prepare for the journey, what to carry on one’s person, 
how to avoid being robbed and exploited on the way, 
and where to stay en route. These actors usually do not 
expect financial remuneration, but the migrant may run 
up ‘cultural debts’ in social systems of reciprocity, which 
ought to be repaid at an unspecified point in the future. 
Transactional actors include marabouts (spiritual 
leaders); cokseurs, who are found in bus depots and 
at various transit points picking out migrants with 
an eagle eye to recruit them for particular drivers; 
border police; and in the case of sea migrations, also 
the pirogue captains and the fishermen who help 
construct boats. The migration project often starts 
with the aspiring migrant working to save money or 
selling land or animals to finance the journey. Families 
may or may not be involved at this stage and several 
migrants said they left without informing anyone, 
for fear of being stopped. Parents are reluctant to 
support irregular migration because the dangers are 
well known. Some support the project and consult 
marabouts or other psychics to seek protection for 
their wards; they can pay 100,000–150,000 CFA 
francs for this service. The marabout might also ask 
for offerings of other kinds: a rooster, or a goat which 
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is killed to prepare a meal for the whole community. 
This is a way of earning good fortune through good 
deeds. Gris-gris (amulets or lucky charms) and magic 
potions are given in preparation for the journey 
to ‘force fate’ to prevent deportation, which is the 
ultimate failure. Forcing fate also means seeking 
protection against theft, scams and all the other 
hazards that could occur along the way. There are 
thus enormous hopes for the migrant and his success. 
A long and complicated 
journey
After this point the migrant is passed on from one 
transactional actor to another, starting with agencies 
who advertise themselves as specialists in delivering 
migrants to Europe. These can be tour operators 
whose operations have gone underground since the 
criminalisation of migration facilitation. Many smugglers 
are based in Tambacounda. The last one to trade openly 
was charging each migrant 150,000 CFA francs for 
arranging their passage to Libya. These agencies then link 
up with cokseurs and drivers to facilitate the clandestine 
journey of migrants to certain ‘ghettos’ at transit points 
in which they have an interest. All of this is done under 
the interested, benevolent watch of the police.
Cokseurs often recruit migrants on the basis of their 
language and ethnicity, as they use this to establish 
rapport and trust. They use words in local languages 
to greet them, such as nagandef in Wolof or diarama 
in Puular. They employ mobile phones and digital 
technologies to entice the migrant to their transport 
operator. This includes showing them photos on 
Facebook of Africans looking happy in Europe and 
messages on WhatsApp from migrants supposedly 
thanking the cokseur for a successful journey. These 
ploys are adopted to make the migrant believe that 
the cokseur has the connections to deliver them safely 
to Italy or Spain. They don’t hesitate to take advantage 
of the migrant’s fear and anxiety to tie them into an 
arrangement. The cokseur is paid by the drivers but he 
is known to extract money from migrants as well, for 
example by selling them sim cards and overcharging.
High costs but no guarantee 
of safety
Once the migrants are in the vehicle, the drivers take 
them to particular ghettos which they have a personal 
connection with through the managers. Ghettos are 
staging posts and are typically organised on the basis 
of nationality. To enter the ghetto, migrants must pay 
the cokseurs there an entrance fee of 20,000–100,000 
CFA francs. These cokseurs belong to Peulh, Wolof, 
Mandingue and Jola ethnic groups and cater to 
migrants from those groups. The conditions inside 
are cramped and mercenary. All sense of a cohesive 
community breaks down in these locations and 
there is a complete lack of trust or mutual help. As 
one migrant remarked, ‘Everyone for himself and 
God for us all.’ Those without money must work to 
survive, otherwise they will starve. Migrants work as 
coffee-sellers, clothes-washers, hairdressers and petty 
traders as well as doing unpaid work such as cooking 
and cleaning to maintain the ghetto. Each nationality 
has a representative called the ‘chief’, who is linked 
through another layer of intermediaries to a particular 
smuggler. Only those in ghettos will be put in touch 
with drivers for the next part of the journey and from 
this point the migrants are firmly locked into broker 
networks. Although the accommodation in ghettos 
is run by brokers on migrant money, the migrants are 
treated like captive slaves. The chiefs in the ghetto 
can speak Arabic and they negotiate the terms of the 
onward passage with drivers, who are often from Libya. 
The chiefs collect money from the migrants and tell 
them to come to a particular departure point but there 
were accounts from the migrants of being cheated and 
the trip not materialising. Through their connections 
the chiefs may also help migrants to have passports 
forged in Mali for a charge of 50,000 CFA francs. 
The crossing of the desert is done in ‘combat’ in 
overloaded pick-up trucks led by smugglers armed 
with Kalashnikovs. The guns are meant to protect the 
smugglers not only against robbers along the way but 
also against the migrants they are carrying. They fear 
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strong solidarity among migrants, and arm themselves 
to avoid any rebellion during the crossing of the Sahara. 
Conditions in the desert are extremely dangerous and 
precarious. They tie wooden sticks to the sides of the 
vehicle, which offer flimsy support to migrants as they 
travel standing up or perched on the sides. The van 
drivers are ruthless and if a migrant loses his balance 
and falls, they do not stop to rescue him because they 
have already been paid and there are no legal or moral 
checks against such behaviour in the desert. 
At every border crossing, migrants must pay a ‘tax’ to 
the border police. Crossings into Burkina Faso are the 
most expensive and difficult; migrants pay an average 
of 40,000 CFA francs at the border. In Niger and Mali 
around 30,000 CFA francs are extracted at the border. 
In addition, they pay banknotes of 1,000 CFA francs 
or 2,000 CFA francs at various internal checkpoints all 
the way to Tripoli. The border police are embedded 
in the system and further extract money from the 
migrant rather than protecting him or her.
Boat journeys are similarly harrowing. Pirogues or 
dugout boats are constructed on the shores with 
the help of local fishermen and tightly crammed 
with migrants. Navigation techniques are basic and 
only the captain has a compass and phone. Mental 
breakdowns and accidents, with migrants either 
falling or being pushed overboard, are common. 
It is difficult to state with precision the costs related to 
the journey, especially since they may vary, depending on 
the negotiations between the migrant and the various 
intermediaries and also the different rates offered. Our 
research shows that, on average, at the beginning of 
migration, the migrant carries with him/her a sum of 
between 105,000 and 250,000 francs. As s/he progresses 
along the migration routes, the expenses increase to 
amounts ranging from 900,000 to 1,500,000 francs. 
Further large sums may be needed if the migrant 
is held in transit or kidnapped along the way. The 
Senegalese compatriot or Gambian neighbour 
who was thought by a migrant to be helping 
and supporting him/her is often involved in the 
kidnapping of migrants, in complicity with Libyans, 
in order to claim a ransom. Typically migrants are 
beaten and they call their families, who desperately 
gather money to release them. Money transfers are 
made through Western Union or Orange Money 
directly to the broker. While waiting for his/her 
release, the migrant is treated like a slave. 
It’s all down to chance 
and luck in a mercenary 
environment
In the absence of any legal protection and given a 
completely mercenary environment, the outcomes 
of irregular migration depend on chance and luck. 
It is hardly surprising then that migrants and their 
families place such faith in the marabouts’ blessings. 
Those who survive and succeed in accumulating 
enough money to make the crossing to Europe are 
the lucky ones. Many have died in the desert or 
at sea and others have been deported. Repeated 
deportations may force people to become immobile 
and re-establish their original occupations of 
agriculture and animal husbandry but that does not 
extinguish the desire to migrate. 
The migration journeys of the Senegalese from 
Kolda are rarely linear or quick. Interrupted journeys 
with long sojourns at transit points were common. 
In some cases journeys could span several years. 
In one extreme case a migrant from a subsistence 
farming family had remained a migrant for 20 years, 
working his way through successive locations and 
being deported three times. By the time he was 
deported from Mali in 2017 he had lived and worked 
in Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and South Africa. These 
accounts are remarkably different from the accounts 
of irregular migrants in Ghana. Although they too 
are gambling with death and being robbed along the 
way, their journeys are shorter and along established 
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routes, and they do not report being harmed by 
brokers and smugglers to the same extent. The 
reasons for these differences are are not entirely clear 
at this stage of the analysis but a possible explanation 
is the less organised and developed nature of the 
migration industry in Senegal, where the balance of 
power is still with brokers and smugglers. 
The high costs and extreme unpredictability of 
irregular migration have economic and psychological 
consequences for the family as well as the migrant. 
Before they receive a call from the smugglers, 
families may be unaware that their relative has 
been imprisoned. Their anxiety is compounded by 
regular radio broadcasts, testimonies and awareness 
campaigns conducted by non-governmental 
organisations on the dangers of land-based migration. 
Implications for policy
There is a vast clandestine infrastructure involving 
both state and non-state actors, where roles are 
overlapping and boundaries are blurred. The same 
actors, such as the border police, may perform both 
formal and informal roles, which poses difficult 
challenges for government. Criminalisation seems to 
have served mainly to create more opportunities for 
smuggling and rent-seeking rather than eliminating 
the practices of smugglers and their networks. In a 
country where nearly 40 per cent of the population 
is poor and the lifestyles that the young aspire to 
cannot be obtained at home, there are no easy ways 
of addressing the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration. 
A more serious and honest look at the global forces 
underlying international (under)development is 
necessary to start identifying lasting solutions to the 
current situation. 
Creating more channels for legal migration would 
help to avoid some of the extreme hardships faced 
by migrants and reduce the need for smugglers. 
There is a need to revisit temporary migration 
programmes, as they could offer benefits to both 
migrant-sending countries like Senegal and countries 
with a labour deficit in Europe.
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